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QUO VADIS SERBIA 
   INTRODUCTION 
The new government of Serbia has a formidable task of rebuilding the country after 
sixty years of socialist rule. Property rights in business firms, the choice of business 
organizations, and the way in which they are to be governed is certainly among the 
most critical decisions the new government has to make. The critical distinction is 
between business organizations that have to prove themselves in competitive markets 
and those that the government protects from competition. In this paper, I would like to 
make a contribution to discussion about business firms in post-socialist Serbia. I will 
concentrate on the importance of governance structures, the remarkable success of the 
corporate firm, and the dangers of industrial democracy.  
THE CHOICE OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
I conjecture that the choice of the governance of business firms is quite important for 
the future performance of the economy.  
The rules imposed by fiat, regardless of how well they might be designed, freeze 
governance structures into a rigid system. In effect, they substitute preferences of rule 
makers, that is the individuals who bear no costs of their decisions about the rules, for 
internal contractual agreements among the holders of property rights in the enterprise, 
that is the individuals who bear the costs of organizational choices.  
Alternatively, the government could provide stable property rights in resources and the 
freedom of contract. Stable property rights and credible contracts, in turn, give the 
holders of property rights the freedom (a) to choose what kind of firm they want to 
have (e.g., corporation, partnership); (b) to decide whether they want a centralized or 
decentralized firm, inside or outside directors, a strong director or a strong board; (c) 
to determine the method of rewarding performance (stock options, cash bonuses, 
premium over market wages, non-cash benefits such as long holidays, etc.); and (d) to 
specify trade-offs between profit and other objectives (as the York Times and the Wall 
Street Journal have done). 
We observe many different governing structures in the United States. In some firms, 
boards of directors specialize in handling crises, others appoint top managers from 
among their members, some boards are involved in day-by-day operations, while 
others prefer to remain more detached. All those different governance structures have 
emerged through voluntary contractual agreements and passed the market (survival) 
test. The survival of alternative governance structures is the best evidence that no two 
firms are alike. That is, no single model can specify the best governance structure. 
The American Law Institute, a Philadelphia based non-profit legal research center 
made the most comprehensive attempt in 1983 to promote a single model of corporate 
governance under the title: Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: 
Restatement and Recommendations. The proposal was quickly rejected. The board of 
directors of the New York Stock Exchange refused to vote on the proposal. A leading 
American Executive said that lawyers could not tell business executives how to run 
corporations. And Professor Stigler, a Nobel Laureate, argued that the American Law 
Institute has no right to decide how American business is to be managed.1     
It is also plain wrong to argue that the state could help business enterprises by enacting 
a set of rules reflecting the evolving trend in the governance of business firms. Given 
credible property rights and contractual freedom, no firm needs the law in order to 
adapt to emerging practices. In fact, many firms need to be free to deviate from the 
trend in order to perform better in competitive markets. Analysis and empirical 
observations suggest that the best way to develop governance structures for business 
firms is to let the holders of property rights act in accordance with their judgment of 
their firm’s survival needs. 
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For example, in a large manufacturing firm in Dallas, four out of thirteen members of 
the board are former employees (“inside” directors). Two members of the board are 
current employees (chairman of the board and the president) of the Company. 
Remaining seven members of the board are “outside” directors selected for their 
accomplishments in finance, business and academics. As a condition of their tenure on 
the board, “inside” directors must seek membership on the board of other firms.  
THE CHOICE OF BUSINESS FIRM 
Labor Participatory Firm 
Industrial democracy is an umbrella for all the different forms of labor participation in 
the governance of business firms. Evidence shows that industrial democracy has not 
emerged voluntarily on any significant scale and has failed to perform successfully 
whenever and wherever imposed by fiat. Yet, some members of new government, 
such as Miroslav Labus, have been suggesting that labor participation in the 
governance of business firms is a viable alternative for Serbia. The reason for their 
behavior is quite simple: industrial democracy offers many rent-seeking opportunities 
for those in power, and satisfies many ideological preferences among socialists and 
left-wing intellectuals to be discarded for such a trivial reason as the lack of economic 
performance. One of the best economist of our era, late Karl Brunner, wrote:  
The sacrifice of cognition is particularly easy to detect in the objections to the 
market system induced by discrepancies between one’s desires, glorified as 
social values, and the result of market processes. However, our ability to 
visualize better organizational arrangements, more closely reflecting our 
preferences, yields no evidence that those arrangements can be realized.2
The fact that labor participation in governance has to be mandated by the government 
and protected from competition is the convincing evidence of its inefficiency. A major 
source of this inefficiency lays in the fact that by weakening the right of ownership, all 
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the different forms of industrial democracy create a gap between private and social 
costs of using scarce goods. If labor participation had positive effects on the firm's 
productivity, why don't we observe the labor participatory firm on a significant scale? 
Why don't shareholders negotiate with employees a contract that would make both 
groups better off? If labor participation has to be mandated by law, on what scientific 
(non-normative) ground can we assert that it is a superior method for organizing 
production? There is no law in the United States that says that there shall be no labor 
participation. Indeed, there are cases in which labor participation has emerged 
voluntarily, but it has not happened on any significant scale.  
Germany is a good case for analysis of the consequences of involuntary labor 
participation in the governance of business enterprises. The Codetermination Act of 
1976 in Germany—a capitalist version of the labor-managed firm--applies to all 
business firms that have more than 2,000 employees. The supervisory council (i.e., the 
board of directors) for such firms has twelve members, of whom six are 
representatives of the shareholders and six are representatives of the employees. The 
chairman of the supervisory council is elected by the shareholders and holds the 
deciding vote in case of a deadlock.  
Empirical evidence is simply not consistent with the claim that codetermination 
bestows benefits on workers without any detrimental effects on other members of the 
team. Immediately after the passage of the Codetermination Act of 1976, many 
business firms tried to escape the parity representation on the supervisory board 
through mergers, reorganizations, moving their headquarters abroad, and other 
structural changes. In the late 1970s, codetermination applied to about 650 firms. By 
the early 1980s codetermination covered only about 480 firms. About 120 firms had 
reduced their labor force below the 2,000 limit, while about 50 firms had changed 
their corporate charters. Assuming that both the size and contractual forms of those 
170 firms reflected efficient business decisions, the post-1976 adjustments are a social 
cost of codetermination.  
Jensen and Meckling summarized the economic effects of involuntary constraints on 
the freedom of contract in the following passage: 
Indeed, labor can start, and in rare cases has started firms of its own. Moreover, 
firms are free to write any kind of contracts they wish with their employees. If 
they choose to, they can offer no-dismissal no lay-off contracts (tenure at 
universities). If they choose to, they can establish worker councils and agree not 
to change production methods without worker approval. Moreover, employers 
would [encourage] such practices if the benefits exceeded the costs. 
Furthermore, if laborers value the security and "self-realization" which such 
participatory arrangements afford them at more than their costs to the employer, 
they are in a position to offer voluntary changes, which it will pay the employer 
to take. ...Since those arrangements are [rarely] observed, we infer that workers 
do not value the security, management participation, etc. at more than the cost of 
providing them [emphasis mine]. 3
The Corporate Firm  
In the United States, we observe a large number of different types of business firms 
such as single proprietorships, partnerships, corporations, mutuals, not-for-profit 
firms, cooperatives, etc. All those firms have emerged through voluntary contractual 
agreements and survived competition from other types of firms; that is, law mandated 
none of those types of business firms. They reflect the freedom of individuals to write 
any kind of contract they wish with each other and bear the costs (risk) of their choice. 
The corporate firm, by far the most successful type of wealth-producing business 
organization, is a product of this competitive environment. The issue is why has the 
corporate firm done so well? I conjecture that the advantages of the corporate firm 
over other types of private ownership firms arise from three critical factors: the rule of 
limited liability, the dispersion of shareholding, and the market for corporate control. 
Let me briefly describe the meaning and consequences of each of them. 
The Law of Limited Liability.  Mass production of goods, production of durable 
goods, production of heavy machinery, the implementation of new technologies, 
innovations, and many other investments and commercial activities require pulling 
together large amounts of capital. Banks could not satisfy this huge demand for capital 
without driving interest rates to a level at which many opportunities for economic 
growth would fail to be exploited. We have enough research and empirical evidence to 
know that the state can neither raise voluntarily large amounts of capital nor be trusted 
with the use of  investable funds. Except in frictionless blackboard models, state 
ownership provides strong incentives for the allocation of resources to by-pass the 
market test.  
In response to economic pressures from within the system, numerous contractual 
agreements were tried in order to resolve the need for pulling together large amounts 
of capital. Eventually a new legal concept evolved the rule of limited liability.4 By 
limiting each owner's (i.e., equity investor’s) liability to the market value of his 
investment in the firm, the law created incentives for equity investments to be divided 
into small shares and traded in financial markets. That is, breaking up equity interests 
into relatively small shares, corporate firms were able to attract funds from small 
savers. The advantage derives from the anonymous alienability of shares, which 
enables shareholders to sell their shares without requiring the approval of other 
shareholders. By contributing to a substantial reduction in the transaction costs of 
raising large amounts of investable funds, the rule of limited liability made the 
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corporate firm the most effective method of voluntarily gathering large amounts of 
capital for long-lived ventures. 5
The Dispersion of Shareholding. Starting with the dispersion of shareholding, which 
is a fact of life, A. Berle and G. Means6 developed the separation of ownership and 
control thesis. The separation thesis quickly acquired a strong following among the 
critics of capitalism, who routinely ignore the difference between one’s desires and the 
reality of market processes. For many years, Branko Horvat from Croatia and Mihailo 
Markovich from Serbia blamed private ownership for transforming humanity into a 
horde of profit-seeking beasts. Today, they argue that the dispersion of shareholding 
has already socialized private property rights in business firms. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. 
The separation thesis basically says the following: The dispersion of shareholding 
insulates the management from the owners. Thus, the right of ownership is empty 
because the shareholders have no control over the use of their resources. Managers 
control resources, make decisions affecting shareholders’ wealth, and can easily 
protect themselves by soliciting proxies at the company’s expense. If all of the above 
were true the observable consequences of the dispersion of shareholding would have 
to be (1) withering away of private property rights in the corporate firm; (2) the 
transfer of a part of the residual (i.e. shareholders’ wealth) to managers; and, by 
implication (because of lower rates of return), (3) reduced flow of capital into business 
firms with dispersed ownership.   
Empirical observations are consistent with none of these three outcomes. The fact is 
that millions of individuals continue to invest in common stock. Why do they not 
choose other investment opportunities that exist in the United States? Why is equity 
financing not being driven out by investments in fixed claims? Why do we not observe 
                                                 
5  See Easterbrook, F.; Fischel, D. (1991): The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 
chapter 2.  
6   Berle, A; Means, G. (1933): The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, 
New York. 
 
a lower bid price for stocks of corporations with dispersed ownership relative to those 
firms that have less dispersed ownership? Why do dispersed ownership corporations 
not have lower rates of growth of shareholders' wealth?   
The Benefits of the Dispersion of Shareholding. The dispersion of shareholding is, in 
fact, an important source of the efficiency of corporate firms. 
1. There is no law in the United States that says that people have to buy shares in 
corporate firms. It is their reversible choice (and they themselves bear the costs of 
making a bad one). And they have many other alternatives for their savings. It means 
that people who buy shares voluntarily separate themselves from controlling their 
property. And they do that for a good reason. They voluntarily transfer their resources 
to those who, in their judgment, are good in making money. That is, shareholders 
choose to specialize in bearing the risks. Managers are individuals who specialize in 
managing the risk. The dispersion of shareholding is then fully consistent with the law 
of comparative advantage. 
2. In the United States, even small savers can diversify their investment portfolios and 
avoid the firm-specific risks. The separation thesis then “leads to lower capital costs 
for firms in the economy, and to greeter innovation, as shareholders are capable of 
investing in riskier ventures due to their ability to mitigate such risk through 
diversification.”7
3. The fact that shareholders have incentives to include innovative ventures into their 
portfolios means that the dispersion of shareholding is a source of capital for small 
start-up companies. 
4.  The diffusion of ownership provides the funds required for economic growth 
without a concentration of economic power within a society. An alternative is a 
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concentration of share ownership in the hands of the state or state protected rent 
seeking coalitions.8  
5. The separation thesis contributes to the development of a large middle class with 
significant and diversifiable stakes in the economy. Highly competitive money 
managers who quickly punish non-performing firms by selling their shares in financial 
markets represent this group, which includes millions of retirees. 
The Costs of the Dispersion of Shareholding. Berle and Means were right in saying 
that the dispersion of shareholding has its costs. But, the fact that the corporate firm 
has continued to prosper could only mean that the benefits of the dispersion of 
shareholding exceed its costs. Let us now identify those costs and the circumstances 
upon which they depend. 
Major costs of the dispersion of shareholding are the transaction costs of monitoring 
managerial decisions that affect shareholders’ wealth, and the costs of hiring and firing 
corporate managers. Given their estimate of transaction costs, corporate managers 
should then be able to transfer some wealth from shareholders to themselves. They can 
do that in a variety of ways such as liberal expense accounts, plush offices, company 
planes, large number of beautiful (but not necessarily efficient) secretaries and 
receptionists, pleasant co-workers, opportunities to contribute to the causes they 
believe in, and so on. The consumption of those goods increases managers’ total 
income over and above their contractual pay, and is conveniently reported as the cost 
of doing business. 
An observable implication of the separation thesis should then be a negative 
relationship between the dispersion of shareholding and the shareholders’ gains in 
wealth; or--the same thing--a lower bid price for stocks of corporation with dispersed 
ownership. However, academic research and empirical evidence have demonstrated 
that no statistically significant relationship exists between the dispersion of 
shareholding and the shareholders’ gains in wealth. Clearly, the private-property free-
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market economy creates incentives to reduce the transaction costs of monitoring 
managerial decisions. To understand those incentives, we must turn to the market for 
corporate control.  
The Market for Corporate Control. The market for corporate control has an 
important consequence: it assures thousands of seemingly powerless shareholders that 
their wealth is well guarded. Three important ways in which that is done are: 
1. In competitive (i.e., non-regulated) financial markets, market valuation of the 
expected future consequences of current decisions by corporate managers raises their 
costs of making decisions that are contrary to the interests of shareholders. With 
bounded rationality and positive transaction costs, market evaluations of the future 
consequences of current decisions are often wrong and are continuously modified. 
However, the critical factor protecting shareholders is that the (top) manager knows 
that his decisions are immediately scrutinized in financial markets, and that market (ex 
ante) valuations of the expected effects of those decisions on the profitability of his 
firms are quickly incorporated into stock prices. That is, financial markets raise the 
manager’s costs of pursuing activities that deviate from the profit-seeking behavior or-
-the same thing--guard the shareholders’ wealth. 
2. The opportunity costs of corporate managers depend on the profitability of business 
firms they manage. That is, the present value of a manager’s future earnings depends 
on the current profitability of his firm. An implication is that the pursuits of objectives 
other than the shareholders’ wealth are costly to the manager in terms of his future 
marketability. The opportunity to pursue his preferences at the expense of potential 
profits has to appear to the manager as a choice between more utility now or more 
income tomorrow. 
3. Hostile takeovers are the most effective mechanism by which the market for 
corporate control assures shareholders that their wealth is well guarded. By 
disciplining corporate managers, hostile takeovers have increased the operating 
efficiency of corporations, their employee productivity, and their shareholder value. 
Macey wrote: “The threat of a takeover creates a positive externality as managers of 
all firms, even those that are not subject to an outside bid, have incentives to maximize 
share value in order to reduce the arbitrage possibility for outside bidders, and thereby 
retain their posts.”9  
4. CONCLUSION 
My impressions are that new rulers in Serbia are most likely to end up making small 
marginal changes in the prevailing government dominated system. How else could one 
explain a recent statement by the prime minister of Serbia that the government needs 
to establish new dynamic agencies to replace slow moving ministries. That is an old 
socialist principle: Got a problem? Run to the state! Of course, we know from Milton 
Friedman, public choice scholars, socialist experiments in Nazi Germany and 
communist Eastern Europe, and costly welfare program in Western Europe that the 
cost of bureaucracy is not the money we pay them but the consequences of their 
policies. An alternative approach for economic reformers is to focus on the 
development of the rule of law (after decades of socialism it will take time for people 
to realize that the law could be credible), an independent judiciary (it will also take 
time to train new judges), and economic freedoms (credible and stable property rights. 
Freedom of contract, and a minimal state).  
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